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FOREWORD* 
Several months ago when I started writing this paper, its princi-
pal goal was to point out some of the inequities in the European 
Union’s 2020 Climate Change Package and attempt to explain 
why this happens. Since then, spearheaded by Hungary, seven of 
the new EU member states have filed a formal complaint with the 
European Commission, contesting the 2020 greenhouse gas emis-
sion targets set out in that policy proposal. Thus this paper now 
also serves as an explanation for why these countries might 
choose to do that. 
 
 
                                                            
*
 I would like to thank the participants at the 2008 Rennes ECPR Joint Ses-
sions Workshop on “The Politics of Climate Change” and András Inotai for 
helpful comments. Comments Welcome. EllisonDL@Gmail.com 
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INTRODUCTION 
Politics lie at the centre of the allocation 
process for CO2/GHG (carbon dioxide 
and greenhouse gas) reduction targets 
and quotas in the European Union (EU). 
Though most presumably agree that EU 
allocation of CO2/GHG reduction targets 
and quotas should both equalize (bur-
den-sharing principle) and minimize the 
impact across individual states, the proc-
ess by which state-by-state quotas are 
allocated is anything but transparent. 
Moreover, judging by the response of 8 
of the 10 New Member States (NMS’s) to 
the CO2/GHG quotas allocated for the 
2008–2012 period,1 or by the response 
of most of the NMS’s to the current 
country-level GHG emission reduction tar-
gets proposed as part of the EU’s 2020 
Climate Change Package introduced on 
January 23, 2008, the process appears 
potentially tilted toward the interests of 
the Old Member States (OMS’s). The ve-
racity of this claim aside, the relative 
lack of transparency in the decision-
making process begs the question both 
of whose interests are most strongly rep-
resented in the final burden-sharing and 
quota allocation and why this is so. 
This paper investigates both why EU 
member states are strongly divided over 
CO2/GHG reduction targets and quota 
allocations as well as whose interests are 
most strongly represented in the current 
structure of EU allocations. Interest di-
vergence is clearly most strongly felt at 
and below the national level of interest 
formation. Yet, what defines the founda-
tion for such interest divergence remains 
both under-researched and controversial. 
Any number of factors—the relative en-
ergy mix (coal, oil, nuclear, renewable 
                                                            
1 Several of the NMS’s have filed claims against 
the European Commission before the European 
Court of Justice. 
or other form), the form of carbon miti-
gation promotion at the national level, or 
relative export carbon intensity—can po-
tentially influence the relative interests of 
individual countries. Comparatively little 
attention, however, has been paid to the 
core problem of variation in relative lev-
els of economic development. 
This paper analyzes those factors that 
best explain the division of interests 
across countries, with a particular focus 
on the division of interests resulting from 
comparative levels of economic develop-
ment. For multiple reasons, Central and 
East European (CEE) NMS’s are likely to 
view CO2/GHG emission reduction targets 
and quota restrictions as real constraints 
on future economic growth. For one, 
CO2/GHG quota allocations may impose 
significant constraints on future economic 
convergence goals. While such constraints 
are potentially avoidable through the 
mass-scale introduction of renewable en-
ergy and comparable scale energy effi-
ciency improvements, these represent 
comparatively high-cost strategies (in par-
ticular in up-front costs). For compara-
tively less advanced countries facing sig-
nificant budgetary constraints (in particu-
lar the EMU convergence criteria), these 
challenges are significant. 
This paper first reviews the problem 
of supra- and international cooperation—
in particular with respect to transbound-
ary issues like climate change. For the 
purposes of comparison, the first section 
briefly outlines some of the problems at 
the root of conflict over climate change 
policy at the international level. The in-
terests of states appear as the most sig-
nificant obstacle to real progress in at-
tempts to outline the parameters of the 
follow-up to the Kyoto agreement. The 
second section then focuses on the ex-
ample of the EU and asks whether things 
decision-making processes have differed 
significantly from those at the interna-
tional level. While the institutions struc-
ture of the EU is clearly more advanced 
than that at the international level, it is 
not clear that this ultimately has a deci-
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sive impact on the ability to share bur-
dens more equitably across the member 
states. This point is then illustrated on 
the basis of three examples taken from 
the general framework of the EU’s cli-
mate-change policy. The final section 
concludes.  
1) GLOBAL WARMING AND 
CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The transboundary nature of global 
warming is inescapable. Though different 
regions of the world experience variation 
in the intensity of global warming’s im-
pact, all regions of the world have been 
affected. Moreover, the challenges of 
climate change and global warming are 
clearly global in character. The key ques-
tion posed by climate change and global 
warming is whether the world’s countries 
can agree to share the earth’s atmos-
phere in an equitable manner. The 
world’s most advanced economies already 
exploit a far greater than equitable 
share of the world’s atmosphere based 
on their share of the world’s population. 
As this fact impinges upon the ability of 
other countries to use the world’s at-
mosphere, such issues are make or 
break issues for the future of mankind 
and world politics. The day has dawned 
where the world must decide how best 
and most equitably to both save and ul-
timately share the earth’s environment. 
In the political science and interna-
tional relations literature, transboundary 
pollution is frequently seen as a force 
capable of overpowering the self-
interested behavior of states and encour-
aging them to cooperate by adopting 
more international and universal policy 
goals. Taking such events as the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Bali discussions as ex-
amples, the evidence that states can find 
common terms for cooperation and 
agreement is at best mixed. While global 
warming and climate change have con-
tributed to the assembly of nation states 
in single locations to discuss and negoti-
ate environmental treaties—as witnessed 
in particular by the signing of formal 
agreements on CO2 emission reductions 
(the Kyoto Protocol)—the degree of real 
success in reducing CO2/GHG output is 
slim. 
One of the principal obstacles to more 
far-reaching commitments on CO2 emis-
sion reductions from individual states is 
the divide between more and less ad-
vanced countries and the appropriate 
distribution of burden-sharing across 
states. Conclusions from the Bali summit 
point to this as well. Both the US and 
the EU have attempted to tie an agree-
ment on climate change to WTO tariff 
reductions on products with “clear envi-
ronmental benefits”.2 At the same time, 
there has also been discussion of at-
tempting to impose tariffs on goods with 
high negative environmental impacts (e.g. 
iron, steel, aluminum, cement, glass, pa-
per).3 Most discouraging is the impres-
sion that the advanced states repeatedly 
wrench advantage from agreements 
without more direct attention to the sim-
ple matter of reducing CO2 emissions. 
The US–EU WTO proposal, for example, 
so far excludes biofuels such as ethanol 
which Brazil produces in abundance.4 
Ironically, both the US and the EU have 
placed considerable emphasis on the de-
velopment and production of biofuels.5 
                                                            
2 See www.cnn.com: “US, EU Push Green Trade 
at Bali” (Dec. 9th, 2007). 
3 See www.wsj.com: “U.S. Plans on CO2 Perco-
late” (Sept. 25th, 2007). 
4 Though controversial whether biofuels—due to 
high CO2 output and environmental damage in-
flicted by agricultural production—produce any 
added benefit in terms of CO2 output (see e.g. 
Doornbosch and Steenblik, 2007), the recently 
signed US Energy Bill placed a heavy emphasis 
on biofuels production and use. Attempts to 
block biofuels imports from Brazil should pre-
sumably be interpreted as blatant protectionism. 
5 The US Energy Independence and Security Act 
passed in December 2007 mandates an increase 
in biofuel production from an annual 7 to 36 
billion gallons of ethanol by 2022 (58 per cent is 
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Imposing higher tariffs on environmen-
tally damaging goods would unevenly 
disadvantage the developing world. 
Moreover, the EU’s decision to consider 
such tariffs in its 2020 Climate Change 
Package (independently of the US) trig-
gered strong criticism from the US.6 
What some have labeled “nano hypoc-
risy”,7 dramatically pervades the entire 
global warming and climate change de-
bate with the implication that states—and 
first among them developed states—
remain focused primarily on self-interest 
and secondarily—if at all—on climate 
change. Scapegoating the developing 
world has become something of a pas-
time for the world’s more advanced 
countries. From pointing out China’s 
growing CO2 impact on the world’s 
global warming to arguing that saving 
the developing world’s rainforests is one 
of the keys to saving the planet, such 
arguments typically shift attention away 
from the two most important factors re-
lated to the current status and future 
                                                                                          
intended to be from so-called “cellulosic” sources, 
i.e. not from corn). The EU’s approach an-
nounced in January 2008 promotes a 10 per 
cent use of biofuels by 2020 (and favours “sus-
tainable” sources for biofuel production). 
6 The EU announced its plans for new climate 
change legislation on Jan. 23rd, 2007. Despite the 
EU and US WTO suggestions to introduce similar 
measures, US Trade Representative Susan Schwab 
responded to the EU position with dismay where 
the US sees, “climate or the environment being 
used as an excuse to close markets” (Euractiv: 
“Britain and US up in arms against EU carbon 
tax”, Jan. 23rd, 2008).  
7 Michael Renner, in: “Analysis: Nano Hypocrisy” 
(WorldWatch Institute, Jan. 16th, 2008) ultimately 
argues the developed world is unable to ade-
quately balance criticisms of the CO2 output 
threat posed by the developing world with due 
consideration of the consumption habits of the 
developed world. His example pairs Tata’s up-
coming introduction of the Nano car in India 
with Western fascination with the souped up 
Toyota Prius. While journalists and global warm-
ing analysts alike rage at the thought of intro-
ducing the Nano in India, they should be asking 
what the benefits would be of introducing the 
Nano to Western markets. According to thumb-
nail calculations, the Nano would emit approxi-
mately 30 g/km in CO2, while the Prius report-
edly emits 104 g/km. The Prius does get some-
what better mileage 65.7 mpg compared to a 
reported 50 mpg for the Nano. 
increases in global warming—the devel-
oped world’s overwhelming contribution 
(the US produces almost 5 times per 
capita world CO2 output, Russia, Japan 
and the EU approximately 2 times) and 
the general inability of the developed 
world to reverse the co-linear paths of 
economic growth and rising CO2 output.
8 
From all the emphasis and media at-
tention focused on the rising CO2 output 
from developing countries—in particular 
China—one might be led to think the 
root of all evil lies in the developing 
world. Sadly, both in absolute tons and 
on a per capita basis, the US—one of 
the most highly developed nations of the 
world—remains the world’s #1 emitter 
of CO2. As illustrated in Table 1, be-
tween 1990 and 2005, the US emitted 
between just over one-fifth and just un-
der one-quarter of the world’s total CO2 
output. As if these numbers were not 
scary enough, despite US expenditure on 
CO2 related research, the US likewise 
remains far and away one of the highest 
emitters in per capita terms: US per cap-
ita CO2 output is approximately 5 times 
the world average. In per capita terms, 
other developed nations such as Japan 
and the New Europe (an EU of 27 
member states) emit less than half of 
what the US does. China, though rapidly 
approaching absolute US CO2 emission 
levels (and reportedly surpassing them in 
2006 and 2007), in per capita terms 
                                                            
8 Further examples of nano-hypocrisy are the 
following:  instead of pointing to per capita 
CO2/GHG output levels, countries instead insist 
on the problems of absolute levels (e.g. China) or 
energy intensity (e.g. CEE). While many countries 
in the developed world are reconsidering nuclear 
power as an option, states in the Middle East 
wishing to pursue the nuclear option are rapidly 
ostracized. Likewise, though countries rapidly 
point out the problems of de-forestation resulting 
from the ravaging of the rainforest, few empha-
size the role developed countries could play in 
promoting their own re-a-forestation (despite 
studies suggesting this would be beneficial; see 
e.g. Saikku, Rautiainen and Kauppi, 2008). Fi-
nally, when one talks about the problems of the 
world’s population, one looks first at China’s 
discussion of abandoning its one family – one 
child policy rather than considering EU member 
state subsidies to promote larger families. 
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only emits one-fifth of US CO2 output. 
India lags much further behind. While 
oil-rich countries such as Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Brunei 
have substantially higher per capita GHG 
emissions, combined these countries rep-
resented only 0.65 per cent of world 
GHG output in 2000.9  
US reliance on coal-burning power 
plants does much to boost these num-
bers. Even more sadly, the US continues 
to resist a leadership role when it comes 
to climate change and global warming—
despite its obvious contribution to this 
problem (California fares much better). 
Rather than rise to the occasion, the US 
argues that countries such as China—
despite dramatically lower per capita 
CO2 output—be tied to the same rules 
and regulations. Equally sadly, those 
European countries that have assumed a 
leadership role by signing onto the Kyoto 
Protocol (despite the lack of support 
from the US), prefer to lead by vision 
rather than by example. True, the full 
partnership of countries like China and 
India would be a tremendous asset to 
the protocol—making it possible perhaps 
to pull even the US into its fold. But un-
til the more advanced countries are able 
to lead by example rather than coercion, 
little is likely to change. 
Most disturbingly, the developed world 
has made virtually NO progress in re-
ducing its own CO2 emissions from 1990 
levels as mandated by the Kyoto Proto-
col. At best, a few stellar performers 
have made it possible for the EU as a 
whole to halt and mildly reduce its rate 
of CO2 output growth (details of the EU 
case are discussed in the following sec-
tion). Other signatories to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol have failed miserably. Friends of 
the Earth, for example, is suing the Ca-
nadian government for failure to abide 
by its Kyoto Protocol obligations (though 
Canada promised a 6 per cent reduction 
of 1990 levels by 2010, emissions rose 
                                                            
9 These numbers are from the webpage of the 
World Resources Institute. 
by 25-35 per cent. As EU member states 
have had an equally difficult time abid-
ing by their Kyoto Protocol commitments, 
similar actions may well be on the hori-
zon in Europe. Though Japan committed 
to reducing CO2 emissions by 6 per cent 
over 1990 levels, in 2005 its emissions 
were 7.8 per cent above 1990 levels and 
Japan chose to buy carbon credits from 
Hungary.10 Finally, the fact that the US, 
China and India continue to resist sign-
ing on to the Kyoto Protocol suggests 
that state interests continue to dominate 
the debate on all fronts. 
There are important and profound 
reasons why the less developed and rap-
idly growing nations (China, India and 
many more) hesitate to sign the Kyoto 
pact that have little to do with whether 
or not Kyoto—at least in principle—is a 
good idea. The root problem is that 
unless the advanced nations can pave the 
way to greater domestic-level CO2 reduc-
tions, they will never be able to convince 
the less developed nations that compara-
ble levels of economic development can 
be achieved with lower CO2 emissions. 
Committing to a program that would 
trigger sanctions when targets are not 
met is incompatible with the goals of 
economic development and convergence 
and unreasonable in a context where the 
advanced nations are unable to illustrate 
the feasibility of the path they promote. 
The potential for such ceilings to act as 
future constraints on the project of eco-
nomic growth and convergence is reason 
enough to make such countries hesitant 
to join the fold of Kyoto promoters. The 
only less developed nations in the world 
that have agreed to this kind of regimen 
are in fact the Central and East Euro-
pean Countries (CEEC’s) who, as part of 
the EU accession agreement, agreed to 
future ceilings that may not sit well with 
future economic growth aspirations.  
                                                            
10 See www.portfolio.hu: “EBRD to buy “carbon 
credits” from Hungary for Spain, Ireland – offi-
cial” (Mar. 26th, 2008). 
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2) GLOBAL WARMING AND 
CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY        
IN THE EU 
In the EU of course, everything was 
supposed to be different. Political coop-
eration at the supranational level was 
supposed to make it possible for states 
to share their burdens and find “com-
munity” solutions to common problems. 
Though possessed of an institutional 
structure that—at least in principle—
makes it possible to identify “Commu-
nity” goals and formulate common 
“Community” solutions, there is a long 
literature suggesting most EU decision-
making continues to be dominated by the 
interests of states and intergovernmental 
principles.11 
The EU’s approach to climate change 
policy encompasses both the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the cur-
rent 2020 Climate Change package in-
troduced by the European Commission 
on January 23rd, 2008. Though the initial 
policy goals agreed in the Kyoto Protocol 
represent a significant reversal of world 
trends—in contrast to most other major 
countries of the world, the EU agreed to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 8 per cent by 
2012—overall EU performance in meeting 
these targets has to-date been lackluster. 
On paper, the EU will manage to meet 
its Kyoto requirements due to the East-
ern Enlargement, not state performance.  
Diverging from the general parameters 
of the Kyoto Protocol, EU member states 
chose to “more fairly” redistribute the 
burden of CO2 emissions reductions 
across countries. Performance however 
bears no resemblance to initial targets 
(see Table 2 for data on individual 
                                                            
11 The current author has also contributed (in 
particular Ellison, 2006a). Much of the relevant 
competing literature is also cited in that article. 
See also Moravcsik (1999, 1997, 1991). 
country performance).12 As illustrated by 
Figures 1 & 2, the lion’s share of suc-
cessful emission reductions occurred in 
the CEEC’s. Western EU member states 
managed to reduce total GHG emissions 
by only 2 per cent (when individually 
selected base years are used for this cal-
culation) and 1.5 per cent when the 
originally proposed 1990 base year is 
used. These figures disguise the more 
favorable performance of a few Western 
countries—in particular in Denmark and 
Sweden and to some extent Germany 
and the UK. In general however, the CEE 
NMS’s—by joining the EU—make it pos-
sible for the EU as a whole to appear to 
meet its Kyoto requirements. Put differ-
ently, a set of countries representing 
20.8 per cent of the EU population are 
responsible for approximately 75 per 
cent of EU CO2 emission reductions over 
the period 1990–2005—about 3.6 times 
the relative contribution of the OMS’s. 
How things will look in the next 
round up to 2020 is anybody’s guess. 
Negotiations on the EU’s 2020 Climate 
Change Package are in their initial 
stages. The conclusion of the EU’s March 
2007 summit called for the following 
features:  (1) a 20 per cent reduction in 
GHG emissions by 2020 (30 per cent 
with the support of a renewed interna-
tional Kyoto Protocol extending until 
2020), (2) a 20 per cent increase in the 
share of renewable energy sources, (3) a 
20 per cent reduction in energy use (po-
tentially from increased energy efficiency) 
and (4) a 10 per cent increase in the 
share of biofuels in the general fuel mix. 
Member states (in the Council of Min-
isters) and representatives in the Euro-
pean Parliament must agree on the en-
ergy and climate-change package by 
                                                            
12 A few countries were able to deviate from the 
1990 base year by choosing base years in the 
mid- to late 1980’s in which CO2 and other 
GHG emissions were highest. Thus for example, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia 
benefited significantly from this choice of base 
year (see also Ellison, 2006b: 21). The effect of 
deviation in the choice of base year is reflected 
in the numbers in the last column of Table 1. 
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March 2009 to place Europe in a strong 
bargaining position at global climate-
change negotiations in Copenhagen in 
November 2009. The forthcoming deci-
sions will set EU member states on a 
development path that will be difficult to 
alter in the years that follow. The ele-
ment of potential irreversibility in these 
climate-change policy strategies will 
weigh heavily on the individual countries 
and European Parliamentary Representa-
tives (MEP’s) choosing from among the 
different options present in the EU’s fu-
ture climate-change strategy and addi-
tional strategies. 
The notion that there is ONE country 
position driving the 2020 climate-change 
policy package is untenable. However, 
countries certainly strive to put their 
mark on the 2020 policy package. For 
one, Germany was the principal propo-
nent of the general policy package, 
pushing for it during the German presi-
dency in 2007 and achieving approval of 
the initial guidelines sent on to the Euro-
pean Commission in March 2007. The 
UK also appears to be playing a signifi-
cant role behind the scenes. With the 
most fully developed country position on 
the policy package, in particular on the 
Guarantee of Origin green-certificate sys-
tem being proposed (COM(2008) 19 fi-
nal), the UK appears to have influenced 
considerable influence.13 Moreover, indi-
vidual countries repeatedly promote posi-
tions that reflect relative comparative ad-
vantages in energy production, energy 
security concerns or heavy investment in 
either energy intensive industries or ser-
vices (the UK, France and other countries 
on the nuclear path, the CEEC’s on 
heavy industry, the UK and Poland on 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), etc.). 
A number of the details of individual 
2020 policy-package proposals and their 
                                                            
13 In this regard, previous Commission papers on 
renewable strategies (see “The Support of Elec-
tricity from Renewable Energy Sources”, 
SEC(2008) 57 and the precursor to this study 
COM(2005) 627) strongly favored the feed-in 
tariff systems employed to great success in coun-
tries like Germany and Spain. 
related Impact Assessments, however, 
were arrived at in relative obscurity. 
Transparency is in fact a serious prob-
lem where the definition of emissions’ 
targets and the assessment of their im-
pact are concerned. As just one exam-
ple, the mathematical models and data 
used for the Commission’s Impact As-
sessments (SEC(2008) 85) are proprietary 
and not readily available either to the 
academic research community or to pol-
icy makers and their respective staff 
members in the member states. This fact 
alone raises serious questions about the 
overall transparency of the consultation 
and negotiation process. Further, it raises 
serious questions about the viability of 
social scientific assessment of EU climate-
change policy. If the academic and re-
search apparatus behind individual mem-
ber-state governments are unable to rep-
licate the models used for making EU-
wide policy proposals and assessing im-
pact, they cannot seriously test, critique 
or otherwise assess the proposed policy 
models in a meaningful manner.  
Why such methods and strategies have 
been chosen by the European Commission 
remains unexplained both to the scientific 
and to the political community in the 
member states. Such a situation must 
presumably be considered unacceptable 
and member-state governments are likely 
to demand resolution of this problem. 
Though there is little time left to make 
these important decisions, they should 
presumably be a product of “Commu-
nity” policy in order for them to be 
supported, approved and to garner ade-
quate legitimacy. In this regard the 
PRIMES and other models (GEM-E3, 
POLES and PACE, developed at the E3M 
lab at the National Technical University 
of Athens and elsewhere)14 and their use 
in the setting of burden sharing targets 
and impact assessments requires re-
evaluation. Despite the increasing preva-
                                                            
14 The POLES model, for example, was developed 
at the Institute for the Politics and Economics of 
Energy at the CNRS (Centre National de Recher-
che Scientifique) in France. 
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lence of laudable scientific values based 
on transparency and reproducibility, the 
calculations and formulae used are not 
publically available, nor is the database 
upon which they are calculated. Equally 
troubling, no competing research cur-
rently offers alternative models and pre-
dictions on viable and meaningful EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and many 
other targets.  
Hungary (and other new member 
states) filed a legal case against the 
European Commission (T-221/07) before 
the European Court of Justice on June 
26th, 2007 regarding the firm-level CO2 
emission quotas approved for 2008–
2012. The Hungarian case argues the 
Commission failed to consider all avail-
able and relevant information—in par-
ticular the data and information Hun-
gary filed with the Commission in its Na-
tional Allocation Plan—and further that 
the Commission contravened the princi-
ples of transparency by failing to share 
the data and calculations used to arrive 
at the quotas established for the 2008–
2012 period (see e.g. the Official Journal, 
Aug. 25th, 2007).  
Though the problem of transparency 
makes it difficult to divine the structure 
of interests behind various elements of 
the Commission’s climate-change policy 
package, the remainder of this paper 
presents at least three ways in which 
powerful divisions across less and more 
advanced states pervade the structure of 
the current 2020 Climate Change Pack-
age. The following section addresses the 
general problem of economic growth and 
climate change in the EU. The second 
section discusses the problem of the 
choice of base year that arose with the 
current distribution of the burden for 
reducing GHG emissions by the year 
2020. Finally, the third section discusses 
the strategy for reducing emissions 
across ETS sectors. 
3) ECONOMIC GROWTH VS. 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change and economic growth 
challenges were heightened by the March 
2007 European Council Summit commit-
ment to reduce GHG emissions by 20 
per cent by the year 2020. While NMS’s 
achieved quite dramatic reductions in 
their levels of CO2 output between the 
years 1990–2004 (due to the decline of 
heavy industry and many other factors),15 
most OMS’s exhibit remarkably little 
success (see Table 2). Though Germany 
is perhaps the most successful OMS, a 
large share of CO2 reductions are the 
result of economic change in the former 
East Germany. Countries such as Sweden 
and Denmark, the UK and to some ex-
tent Germany, on the other hand, de-
serve high marks for their relative ability 
to reduce CO2 and GHG emissions in the 
face of competing concerns and a com-
paratively high level of economic devel-
opment.16 
The principal question for the less de-
veloped economies is whether the more 
advanced EU member states are able to 
lead by example rather than by com-
mand. By their own admission, ten EU 
OMS will achieve their individual Kyoto 
targets primarily by writing Joint Initia-
tive (JI) and Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) investments off national-level 
emissions targets. Only one of the NMS 
(Slovenia) has chosen to take advantage 
of these measures in order to meet its 
target (EEA, 2006: 30). While the Euro-
pean ETS facilitates environmentally bene-
                                                            
15 The range of potential explanatory variables 
here is extensive. For a detailed discussion, see 
Ellison (2006b). 
16 The positive performance of some countries is 
marred by the role of nuclear power (France), 
or Germany’s re-unification with East Germany 
(despite considerable progress in the introduction 
of renewables). 
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ficial investments in those countries and 
plants that represent the greatest poten-
tial return on investment (both in poten-
tial emission reductions and the related 
carbon credits) there are likewise two 
distinct disadvantages to this system. One 
is the postponing of real change in emis-
sion behaviour, in particular in the more 
advanced states. The second is the fail-
ure to demonstrate, by power of exam-
ple, that future economic growth is 
compatible with reduced emissions. 
Without significant GHG reductions in 
the more advanced states, the pursuit of 
both economic growth and CO2/GHG 
emission reductions may prove incom-
patible. Due in particular to the starting 
points of individual countries, Kyoto im-
posed “ceilings” are likely to impinge 
upon growth and convergence interests. 
As evident in Table 2, the less advanced 
Western states (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) have continued their 
rapid growth in CO2/GHG emissions on 
into the period 1990–2005 and show no 
signs of slowing down alongside com-
paratively rapid rates of economic 
growth. Table 3 represents a rough 
thumbnail estimate of GHG output levels 
given convergence on the 2005 EU aver-
age GDP (countries already above the 
average EU GDP have been excluded 
from the table).17 Columns I calculates 
the GHG output this would represent 
based on 2005 levels and columns III 
and V compare this number to the 2012 
and 2020 targets. Significant growth 
constraints arise, suggesting the ability of 
the more advanced states to reduce CO2 
emissions relative to GDP presumably de-
fines future limits to economic growth—
                                                            
17 This measure is based only on the ratio of 
2005 GDP to the 2005 EU average GDP used as 
a multiplier to estimate future emission associated 
with higher GDP output. This measure ignores 
however potential changes in the structure of 
production (e.g. increased size of service sector), 
reductions in energy intensity, general improve-
ments with regard to CO2 and GHG mitigation 
and other changes. A more sophisticated measure 
should take these additional factors into account 
and would reduce the estimates in columns III 
and V. 
along with EU climate policy—for both 
more and less advanced states. 
The European Commission’s 2008–
2012 strategy for setting emissions tar-
gets provides a meaningful example. The 
Commission required NMS’s to scale 
back their national allocation plans for 
the period 2008–20012 by between 12 
and 55 per cent (see Table 4). For the 
OMS’s, some 90 per cent of CO2 quotas 
were accepted. As indicated above, eight 
of the ten NMS’s have initiated legal 
challenges. Seen against the backdrop of 
quite substantial NMS GHG and/or CO2 
emissions reductions between 1990 and 
the present, these Commission imposed 
ceilings are difficult to understand. 
Moreover, given the lackluster perform-
ance of most of the OMS’s reducing 
GHG and CO2 emissions, many of the 
Commission goals often appear unattain-
able. Despite the objections raised by the 
NMS’s, compared to emissions levels in 
2006, the Commission’s cap approvals 
mostly require significant reductions from 
the OMS’s and permit increases in CO2 
emissions in the NMS’s. Based on these 
numbers, the NMS’s position on CO2 
caps is not immediately obvious.  
Two basic problems, however, lurk 
behind the scenes. For one, CEE requests 
for higher CO2 quotas are in part the 
result of rapid economic growth and in-
creasing economic investment. In Hun-
gary, for example, 2006 verified emis-
sions did not include the future emis-
sions of some 5 plants scheduled to 
come online in 2007.18 Thus over the 
period 2008–2012, firms in Hungary—in 
order to create room for new installa-
tions—must find ways to reduce emis-
sions. Though little public discussion has 
emerged, quota allocation decisions have 
an effect on future locational investment 
decisions and act as potential barriers to 
entry. In this regard, overly restrictive 
quotas may limit future investment and 
                                                            
18 Interview with representative from the Hungar-
ian Ministry of the Environment and Water. 
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hinder convergence-related economic 
growth. 
The second basic problem concerns 
the following two key questions: (1) 
whether the more advanced states are 
genuinely able to achieve real CO2 emis-
sions reductions, and (2) whether or not 
emissions’ targets will act as constraints 
on future economic growth. While the 
European Commission proscribes CO2 re-
duction targets through the mechanism 
of the ETS and national allocation plans, 
little is really known about the limits of 
potential future CO2 reductions. As noted 
above, the more advanced states—apart 
a few notable exceptions—have not 
achieved significant emissions reductions.  
4) THE CHOICE OF BASE YEAR 
(1990 OR 2005)? 
The 2020 Climate Change Package in-
corporates a shift from the original 1990 
base year adopted in the Kyoto Protocol 
to a new base year, 2005. As illustrated 
by the basic country positions outlined in 
Table 5,19 virtually all of the CEEC’s 
were opposed. None of the Commission 
documents reviewed either discuss or 
justify in meaningful detail the shift to a 
2005 base year. Though the 2005 base 
year is mentioned in the European Com-
mission’s Impact Assessment (SEC(2008) 
85) and other documents, the real im-
pact is neither revealed nor analyzed, 
essentially papering over the potentially 
large and significant impact on the cost 
of mitigation in the CEEC’s and in those 
few Western countries that have already 
made significant progress in reducing 
GHG emissions. 
                                                            
19 Tables 5 and 7 include the positions of the 17 
countries who had posted position papers with 
the European Council’s Consilium website by the 
time of writing. More complete country positions 
addressing all the major issues in the 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package are available in Ellison, 
Fleischer and Hugyecz (2008: Annex). 
For a document that intends to meas-
ure and weigh the total impact of the 
2020 Climate Change Package and ulti-
mately justify the distribution of burden-
sharing across countries, this fact is 
shocking. Reference is clearly made in 
the Impact Assessment to the need to 
place less of a burden on the less ad-
vanced states in order to meet the 2020 
target goals: “This will require developed 
countries to continue to take the lead in 
cutting their greenhouse gas emissions 
and efforts by developing countries to 
significantly reduce their emissions before 
2020” (p.16). The choice of the 2005 
base year for determining required GHG 
emission reductions appears to obliterate 
these good intentions. 
The choice of the 2005 base year for 
the second round of proposed GHG 
emission reductions up through 2020 
sends a rude message to the majority of 
the NMS’s and to those Western states 
that have likewise managed to make 
progress in reducing emissions. As illus-
trated in Figure 3, all of the CEEC’s (ex-
cept for Slovenia) and several Western 
countries (Sweden, Finland, the UK, 
France and Belgium who managed to 
reduce their emissions) are significantly 
or moderately hurt by the choice of the 
2005 base year. The real winners are 
those countries that increased their emis-
sions well beyond the Kyoto target but 
somehow managed to receive even higher 
2020 targets (in particular Malta, Cy-
prus, Spain, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Aus-
tria, Portugal and Italy). The total gain 
or loss in tons of CO2 equivalent result-
ing from the change in base year is cal-
culated for individual states. To provide 
a sense of the magnitude, this number is 
then divided by each country’s 1990 
GHG output.  
The findings seem out of keeping with 
the concept of burden sharing. Given 
that the enlargement essentially saved 
Western Europe from having to meet its 
Kyoto targets, there is considerable irony 
in this outcome. The Eastern enlargement 
provided Western states with a cheap 
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source for purchasing carbon credits, 
saving them from having to make far 
more considerable investments in renew-
ables, energy efficiency and GHG reduc-
tions (in whatever form; Joint Implemen-
tation (JI)/CDM or in the domestic mar-
ket). Setting low emission reduction tar-
gets for the Eastern states and over-
allocating emission credits to domestic 
firms in Western states provided plentiful 
and cheap solutions to potentially costly 
Kyoto goals. Moreover, those countries 
that made the most progress on their 
Kyoto targets will pay the price.  
This point is best represented in Fig-
ure 4 which illustrates a very strong 
correlation between the change in the 
2020 target based on the 2005 base 
year and overall change in GHG emis-
sions between 1990 and 2005. More 
rigorous investigation provides further 
support for these findings even when 
important control variables (per capita 
GDP, energy intensity and a per capita 
target model; see below) are added to 
the regression analysis.20 Countries that 
reduced emissions received higher targets 
(greater negative burdens) while coun-
tries that raised emissions received lower 
targets (or higher positive burdens). 
Though the CEEC’s were “rewarded” for 
their progress—they were able to sell 
surplus carbon credits—this revenue 
stream will presumably be diminished in 
the second stage of the climate mitigation 
strategy from 2013–2020. Though the 
price has varied dramatically, estimates 
suggest that Hungary could take in 
anywhere from 0.8 to 1.7 billion euros 
by 2012 from its sale of carbon credits. 
Most of these revenues are spent on en-
ergy saving investments in the residential 
sector.21 
With respect to the general EU Cli-
mate Change Package, it is incumbent 
                                                            
20 For more detail, see Ellison (2008). 
21 See for example: “Az EBRD szén-dioxid kred-
iteket venne Magyarországtól” (HVG, Mar. 26th, 
2008) and “Nagy a tolongás Magyarország szén-
dioxid-kvóttájáért” (Magyar Nemzet Online, Mar. 
26th, 2008). 
upon the framers of this policy pro-
posal—at the very least—to provide ade-
quate analysis and explanation for this 
dramatic shift in policy orientation. 
Moreover, this analysis raises important 
questions about the potential impact of 
the 2020 targets on the future economic 
growth and convergence aspirations of 
the less advanced states. Since this issue 
is neither raised nor really discussed in 
the Impact Assessment, it seems unlikely 
its overall impact on future economic 
growth is adequately modelled or even 
measured. 
At least part of this shift to the 2005 
base year is driven by external consid-
erations. In the broader international ne-
gotiations over a new Kyoto package, in 
particular for a broad range of less de-
veloped countries, 2005 data is consid-
ered more reliable than 1990 data.22 
However, given that the EU has the nec-
essary institutional setting with which to 
make more reasonable allocations of the 
GHG burden across states, it makes little 
sense to reward past poor performers. It 
is possible, however, to opt for the 2005 
base year and to make reasonable ad-
justments to individual country targets 
that provide for a more equitable distri-
bution of the burden across EU member 
states. 
5) THE ALLOCATION AND 
AUCTIONING OF CREDITS ACROSS 
ETS AND NON-ETS SECTORS AND 
STATES 
As expressed in individual member-state 
positions on the 2020 Climate Change 
Package, several countries would like to 
                                                            
22 Interview with the Hungarian Ministry of the 
Economy. Ministry representatives make the ar-
gument that, due to problems of measurement 
and data reliability in earlier years, a 1990 base 
year will be unacceptable in international negotia-
tions. 
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see more flexibility across EU ETS and 
non-ETS sectors (see Table 7). For the 
CEEC’s, such flexibility would be a sig-
nificant asset. This is above all the case 
since improvements in energy efficiency 
are likely to bring greater returns in 
non-ETS sectors than in ETS sectors—in 
particular in CEEC’s. This does not mean 
there are no firms that could produce 
significant returns on investments in en-
ergy efficiency and GHG emission reduc-
tions. But since the crucial issue in the 
Impact Assessment is the cost efficiency 
of mitigation efforts and their impact on 
growth, it is obviously more advanta-
geous to make energy saving and emis-
sions’ reducing investments where they 
will have the biggest impact and largest 
marginal return. 
While there is a definable logic to the 
current ETS system, it is questionable 
whether this is the best strategy for the 
CEEC’s. For one, these countries have 
already made quite significant cuts in 
overall emissions (see Table 1). For an-
other, in per capita terms, Central and 
East European emissions levels are on 
average well below Western levels (Elli-
son, 2006b). While the energy intensity 
of GDP in CEE remains well above 
Western levels, we know substantially 
less about how different levels of energy 
inefficiency are distributed across differ-
ent sectors of the public and private 
economy. There is a substantially large 
and growing segment that is likely to 
use energy comparatively efficiently. 
Western investors in particular have in-
stalled new plants and physical capital in 
Hungary and elsewhere that, on average, 
are far more efficient than many other 
remaining segments of the economy. 
However, with the rapid rise of energy 
costs in Hungary, many domestic firms 
have likewise been motivated to make 
energy saving investments. 
In the public sector, in part because 
of the lack of both foreign and domestic 
investment, there has been far less 
change. Studies of the potential opportu-
nities for investments in energy efficiency 
in the building sector suggest that en-
ergy use per square meter is considera-
bly higher than in Western Europe 
(ECOFYS, 2006). Built in a time of cheap 
and highly subsidized energy, few build-
ings in CEE approach Western energy 
use standards. As illustrated in Table 6, 
the non-ETS sector contributes signifi-
cantly to total GHG output. Yet, only the 
Western states are permitted (or encour-
aged) to make energy saving investments 
in the non-ETS sector. For the CEEC’s, 
this strategy ultimately means that all of 
their GHG reduction efforts will focus on 
ETS sectors. In light of the above discus-
sion, this makes little sense. For Hun-
gary, the non-ETS sector represents al-
most 70 per cent of GHG output. More-
over, the requirement of putting all of 
Hungary’s efforts into reducing GHG 
output in ETS sectors means that all ef-
forts are focused on a significantly small 
share of the economy and at potentially 
high cost. 
The strategy of imposing a strict divi-
sion between ETS and non-ETS sectors 
seems ill-suited to the pursuit of cost-
efficient strategies for reducing GHG 
emissions and achieving the general 2020 
Climate Change Package targets. More-
over, given the very rudimentary data 
presented herein, it again seems highly 
unlikely that the various options consid-
ered represented the best possible and 
most cost efficient strategies for individ-
ual countries to pursue—in particular in 
CEE. Even though we can expect the 
service sector to grow in size in CEE in 
coming years (assuming these countries 
follow similar development trajectories to 
those in Western Europe), this does not 
mean that great improvements in energy 
efficiency cannot be achieved in the non-
ETS sector. Moreover, placing all the 
emphasis on emission reductions in the 
ETS sectors will likely diminish attempts 
to improve energy efficiency since these 
are not significantly rewarded through 
the ETS system. In fact, without substan-
tial rewards for increased efforts, CEE 
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states may face disincentives to invest in 
energy efficiency. 
As proposed by some member states 
(see the respective country positions in 
Table 7), a system of free allocation 
and/or auctioning across ETS and non-
ETS sectors would give individual states 
more flexibility to promote emissions re-
ductions wherever they are the most cost 
effective. Moreover, the ability to freely 
sell (auction) carbon credits across sec-
tors and states could potentially provide 
more incentive to undertake such invest-
ments. Precisely why such rigidity across 
ETS and non-ETS sectors should be in-
troduced, or why states should not be 
immediately able to auction carbon cred-
its is not immediately clear from the as-
sessment. Moreover, such “rigidity” 
seems likely to cause significant problems 
where “new installations” and the emer-
gence of potential “growth constraints” 
are possible outcomes. Though the inter-
est in documenting “verifiable” emissions’ 
reductions is an important issue, it may 
be possible to solve this problem in other 
ways. 
6) DISCUSSION 
Apart from the obvious advantage of 
promoting greater flexibility across ETS 
and non-ETS sectors, there is at least 
one potential policy alternative that has 
so far not been mentioned or discussed 
that might in fact create the foundation 
for a more equal distribution of the 
burden of reducing GHG emissions 
across states. One such alternative is to 
generate a measure of what per capita 
GHG output should on average be in 
order to achieve the goal of sharing the 
earth’s environment fairly and equitably. 
The November 2007 IPCC report notes 
that GHG reductions must be in the 
range of 50 per cent to 85 per cent by 
2050 compared to 1990 levels. One can 
then use these calculations to derive both 
a 2050 target and a comparable 2020 
target for individual countries based on 
each state’s per capita GHG emissions 
for 2005 and the 2020 and 2050 per 
capita target based on what world per 
capita emissions would have to be to 
achieve the 2007 IPCC goals. 
Outlining GHG emissions’ targets 
based on population has a number of 
advantages. For one it represents what is 
presumably a “fair” sharing of the bur-
den because it bases targets on an equal 
per capita sharing of the world’s envi-
ronment. For another, in contrast to the 
decidedly non-transparent character of 
current European Commission proposals 
on 2020 targets, it is remarkably trans-
parent. At the same time, however, the 
results raise serious questions about the 
ability of the EU 2020 climate package 
to achieve genuine, effective and above 
all sustainable change. The emissions’ 
targets derived from a 50 per cent re-
duction from 1990 levels and an equal 
sharing of the world’s environment are 
already considerably more extensive than 
those currently proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission (imposing the IPCC 85 
per cent reduction target and/or using 
estimated 2020 population figures would 
result in far more severe reduction tar-
gets).  
As illustrated in Figure 5, on the basis 
of these targets, all of the Western 
OMS’s would be required to make dra-
matic and more extensive cuts in GHG 
emissions by 2020 in order to meet 
these proposed targets (2050 targets are 
exactly three times the amount depicted 
for 2020).23 The CEEC’s would likewise 
                                                            
23 Some caution is required when viewing this 
figure. As noted in the sources information, some 
of the required data, in particular on GHG emis-
sions for 2005, is not available (e.g. for China 
and India). Thus 2005 GHG emissions are esti-
mated based on change in CO2 emissions from 
1990–2005. This may lead to some errors, in 
particular for countries like India and China. The 
biggest discrepancy in the numbers appears to 
arise with India in the 1990 GHG and CO2 data. 
This presumably leads to a larger than likely 
increase in estimated GHG emissions from 1990–
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be required to make further dramatic 
cuts, though not as extensive cuts as in 
Western Europe. In sharp contrast how-
ever to the proposed Commission’s 2020 
GHG reduction targets, the distribution 
of the burden would be somewhat re-
versed. Moreover, weighting these figures 
based on past performance would like-
wise provide a meaningful framework 
for negotiation. 
One downside of this model is its 
failure to consider a more equal sharing 
of the burden of emissions’ reductions. 
However, if we impose some of the ex-
isting criteria proposed in the 2020 Cli-
mate Change Package—e.g. variation in 
the level of economic development (as a 
proxy for ability to finance)—Western 
states would be even harder hit by the 
resulting set of targets. In fact, with this 
set of targets some inverse model of 
burden-sharing favouring the more ad-
vanced states might possibly be required 
due to the large and substantial com-
parative costs they would face. However, 
in terms of maintaining an even competi-
tive playing field in the European mar-
ketplace, such concessions would likely 
be unsavoury to CEE producers. 
Of course, the failure to include the 
rest of the world in a new international 
Kyoto II agreement would mean that EU 
efforts are comparatively meaningless. 
Again, as illustrated in Figure 5, signifi-
cant reductions are likewise required 
from the remaining large world econo-
mies—in particular the US—if there is to 
be any progress on the goal of combat-
ing climate change. 
                                                                                          
2005. Thus India, based at least on 2005 GHG 
emissions, possibly would not have to reduce 
emissions under these basic assumptions, but 
might instead have some small amount of room 
for increasing them. 
7) CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset, international co-
operation on issues such as global 
warming is complicated by the conflicting 
interests of states and the difficulty of 
establishing cooperation across states. At 
the international level, cooperation is 
complicated by the fact that the principal 
GHG emitters repeatedly appear to 
scapegoat the less advanced states while 
failing to make real advances or even 
commitments on their own part. The fail-
ure of some of the largest states—in 
particular the US—to participate in exist-
ing venues for international cooperation 
further weakens their meaning and po-
tential success. As has been frequently 
noted by others the 27 Member states of 
the EU were only responsible for ap-
proximately 15 per cent of world CO2 
output in 2005. Thus any effort made 
by the EU alone is ultimately not mean-
ingful in the longer run unless other 
states join. 
Turning to the EU, how the current 
2020 climate-change proposal will fair in 
the EU legislative process remains un-
clear. Though decisions must be made 
quickly, both to adequately prepare the 
groundwork for the next round of nego-
tiations over Kyoto II and to stem the 
tide of climate change, there is a good 
chance current EU negotiations will run 
up against substantial resistance. Though 
the EU potentially provides a framework 
for fairly distributing the burden of re-
ducing GHG emissions, the EU has been 
unsuccessful in doing this. To-date, most 
of the “burden” has been transferred to 
the CEE NMS’s. While this fact produced 
little resistance for the first Kyoto round, 
current negotiations are likely to produce 
far greater resistance. 
Fairness in burden-sharing presumably 
means the more advanced EU member 
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states—in particular those with higher 
per capita GHG emissions—should bear a 
significantly higher share of the burden. 
Moreover, the burden should presumably 
be based on a measure approximating 
both fair and sustainable usage of the 
world’s environment in the international 
sense:  i.e. an GHG emission level that is 
directly correlated with a state’s share of 
the world population. At the same time, 
however, new targets should presumably 
taken into account progress already 
made (or the failure to make progress). 
 To-date, the EU experience leaves 
little assurance that such a fair distribu-
tion of the burden can be achieved. For 
one, the lack of transparency behind the 
choice of GHG emission targets and the 
choice of base year make genuine con-
sultation and negotiation difficult. As an 
exercise in policy formulation and 
evaluation, this is an excellent example 
of how not to do things. More impor-
tantly, some of the policy proposals 
themselves seem ill-suited to achieving the 
important goals of climate mitigation. 
Thus, several of the policy proposals and 
in particular the choice of a 2005 base 
year seem strongly tilted toward Western 
interests and thus destined to jeopardize 
the future of the proposed 2020 Climate 
Change Package. 
Given the overall importance of re-
sponding to the challenge of climate 
change, these points require immediate 
resolution. A first step in this regard 
would be to require the release of the 
relevant data and mathematical models 
to public and scientific scrutiny. A sec-
ond step would be to extend the range 
of possible scenarios being considered in 
the manner suggested above. In particu-
lar, considering greater flexibility across 
EU ETS and non-ETS sectors would seem 
a crucial component to adequate analysis 
of the possible policy scenarios—in par-
ticular for the CEEC’s. A third step 
would be to consider alternatives to cur-
rently proposed targets—in particular 
one based on per capita emissions tar-
gets set at a level that recognizes past 
achievements and thus might facilitate 
greater intra-EU cooperation. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
World CO2 Output in Perspective, 1990–2005 
 
Regional Share of World CO2 Output (%) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005/1990 
US 23.4 23.3 23.8 24.0 24.2 24.1 24.3 24.1 24.4 24.3 24.5 23.8 23.5 22.5 21.8 21.1 -9.6 
Russia n.a. n.a. 8.9 8.0 7.5 7.3 6.6 6.5 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.5 -38.2 
China 10.5 11.0 11.4 12.0 12.9 12.9 12.8 13.4 13.0 12.6 12.3 12.7 13.8 15.5 17.5 18.9 80.2 
India 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.1 54.0 
Japan 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 -7.5 
EU27  19.2 19.0 18.7 18.3 18.2 18.3 18.0 17.9 17.4 17.2 17.4 16.8 16.5 15.8 15.2 -21.0 
Share of  
World CO2 
Output   
71.1 70.7 71.3 71.3 70.5 70.6 70.8 70.1 69.8 69.6 69.6 69.8 70.1 69.2
 
Regional per capita CO2 Output Relative to World per capita Output 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005/1990 
US 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6 -6.2% 
Russia  3.4 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5 -23.4% 
China 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 94.2% 
India 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 47.5% 
Japan 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 10.1% 
EU27  2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 -7.8% 
Ratio of US (EU15) per capita Income to Regional per capita Income 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
US/Russia 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.9  
US/China 17.4 15.9 14.4 12.9 11.9 11.0 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 8.8 8.1 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.2  
US/India 17.1 17.0 16.8 16.5 16.1 15.4 15.0 15.1 14.9 14.6 14.6 14.1 13.9 13.2 12.8 12.1  
US/EU10 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7  
EU15/EU10 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1  
Source: CO2 output data is from the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency (EIA). Population figures and per capita income data are 
from the World Development Indicators online database. 
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Table 2 
Change in CO2 and GHG Output 
 
CO2 GHG Kyoto 
 
1990/1980 2005/1990 2005/1980 2005/1990 2005/BY Target (2012) 
Bulgaria -19.2 -31.2 -44.4 -40.0 -47.2 -8.0 
Czech Republic -62.7 -25.8 -8.0 
Estonia   -26.1   -50.9   -8.0 
Hungary -20.0 -9.3 -27.5 -18.2 -30.7 -8.0 
Latvia -33.6 -58.9 -8.0 
Lithuania   -38.6   -54.1   -6.0 
Poland -21.8 -13.9 -32.7 -17.8 -32.0 -6.0 
Romania 2.5 -42.9 -41.5 -38.2 -45.6 -8.0 
Slovakia -12.6 -33.6   -8.0 
Slovenia   33.7   10.0 0.4 -8.0 
Austria -4.7 43.0 36.3 18.0 -13.0 
Belgium -9.3 9.5 -0.7 -1.3 -7.5 
Denmark -15.8 -9.9 -24.2 -7.0 -21.0 
Finland -5.7 -1.5 -7.1 -2.5 0.0 
France -24.0 13.3 -13.9 -1.6 0.0 
Germany -6.9 -13.9 -19.8 -18.4 -21.0 
Greece 47.3 28.2 88.8 26.6 25.0 
Ireland 15.7 71.0 97.8 26.3 13.0 
Italy 12.7 12.9 27.3 12.1 -6.5 
Luxembourg -8.9 17.1 6.6 0.4 -28.0 
Netherlands 7.6 30.7 40.7 -0.4 -6.0 
Portugal 85.6 48.6 175.8 42.8 27.0 
Spain 15.0 64.5 89.1 53.3 15.0 
Sweden -38.2 9.3 -32.5 -7.3 4.0 
UK -1.6 -3.6 -5.1 -14.8   -12.5 
Cyprus 70.9 76.6 201.7 63.7 0.0 
Malta 74.3 27.4 122.1 54.5   0.0 
EU 15 -3.4 18.0 14.1 -1.5   8 
EU 27   6.5   -8.0 -10.7   
Sources: Own calculation base on CO2 from Eurostat’s online database and reported UNFCC GHG data. 
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Table 3 
2012 and 2020 Growth Constraints? 
 
Business as Usual Estimates 
(Million tons) 2012 Targets 2020 Targets 
 
Estimated BAU GHG 
Output 
(at 2005 avg EU GDP) 
Kyoto Target 
GHG Output 
(2012) 
Percent over 
Kyoto Targe 
(%) 
2020 Target 
(ETS+non-ETS, 
option 4) 
Percent over 
2020 Target 
(%) 
Bulgaria 225.047 97.433 131 77.261 191 
Romania 487.851 211.428 131 175.277 178 
Poland 866.101 502.680 72 421.892 105 
Latvia 24.241 16.320 49 12.587 93 
Lithuania 47.223 32.912 43 25.329 86 
Slovakia 90.731 60.120 51 50.353 80 
Estonia 37.989 30.152 26 21.586 76 
Hungary 138.610 103.081 34 82.825 67 
Portugal 129.328 74.078 75 78.917 64 
Greece 177.456 137.082 29 117.652 51 
Czech Rep. 213.787 171.530 25 145.040 47 
Slovenia 26.976 18.678 44 19.536 38 
Italy 623.751 471.752 32 468.419 33 
Spain 486.630 276.287 76 370.319 31 
Source: Own calculations. EU average per capita GDP from Eurostat online database. Individual country 
Kyoto targets are available in EEA (2007). 2020 targets are based on “option 4” in the Impact Assessment 
(SEC(2008) 85: p.58-9). The formula for estimating BAU GHG output is: (pcGDPEU-avg/pcGDP2005)*GHG2005 = 
est. GHG output. 
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Table 4 
Comparison of 2006 Verified Emissions with Proposed and Approved Emission Caps  
Imposed by the European Commission for 2008–2012 
 
Country 
Verified CO2 
Emissions 2006 
(Million Tons) 
Proposed Cap 
2008–2012 
Approved Cap 
2008–2012 
Percent Difference 
Between 2006 
Verified Emissions 
and 2008–2012 
Approved Cap 
Percent Difference 
Between Proposed 
and Approved 
2008–2012 Caps
(%) 
Cyprus 5.30 7.1 5.48 3.4 -23.0 
Czech Republic 83.60 101.9 86.80 3.8 -14.8 
Estonia 12.40 24.6 12.70 2.4 -48.4 
Hungary 25.40 30.8 26.90 5.9 -12.7 
Latvia 2.90 7.7 3.43 18.3 -55.5 
Lithuania 6.70 16.6 8.80 31.3 -47.0 
Malta 1.98 3.0 2.10 6.1 -29.1 
Poland 215.00 284.6 208.50 -3.0 -26.7 
Slovakia 27.20 41.3 30.90 13.6 -25.2 
Slovenia 8.84 8.3 8.30 -6.1 0.0 
Bulgaria   67.6 42.30     
Romania   95.7 75.90     
Austria 32.40 32.8 30.70 -5.2 -6.4 
Belgium 60.00 63.3 58.50 -2.5 -7.6 
Denmark 34.20 24.5 22.00 -35.7 -10.2 
Finland 45.00 39.6 37.60 -16.4 -5.1 
France 128.80 132.8 132.80 3.1 0.0 
Germany 488.00 482.0 453.10 -7.2 -6.0 
Greece 70.00 75.5 69.10 -1.3 -8.5 
Ireland 21.70 22.6 22.30 2.8 -1.3 
Italy 227.00 209.0 195.80 -13.7 -6.3 
Luxembourg 2.70 4.0 2.70 0.0 -31.6 
Netherlands 87.10 90.4 85.80 -1.5 -5.1 
Portugal 33.10 37.9 34.30 3.6 -9.5 
Spain 185.90 152.7 152.30 -18.1 -0.3 
Sweden 21.90 25.2 22.80 4.1 -9.5 
UK 284.96 246.2 246.20 -13.6 0.0 
Source: Own calculations based on annual verified emissions data and targets from the European Commission. 
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Table 5 
2020 Climate Change Package 
Country Positions: General Comments 
 
 
 General Additional Comment 
Belgium support but want more flexibility and fairer 
burden-sharing (no detail provided) 
need cooperation/participation from other 
developed countries 
Britain Support higher levels of free allocation, prevent 
leakage 
Cyprus emphasize special national circumstances concern about RES target 
Estonia 1990 as base year for GHG's clear rules on electricity import (prevent 
leakage) 
Finland Support  
France Support  
Germany emphasize manufacturing competitiveness, 
proper account of past performance, fair bur-
den-sharing 
step up efforts on energy efficiency 
Greece Support  
Hungary Principal emphasis on 1990 base year  
Italy energy efficiency should be given more weight 
and not left up to states 
RES and GHG targets should be revised in 
light of national potential in non EU ETS 
sectors with due weight to energy effi-
ciency, no or inadequate cost-benefit analy-
sis 
Lithuania should consider progress since 1990 base year states must also ensure energy security, 
economic viability, competitiveness and so-
cial welfare,  emphasize national circum-
stances: closure of nuclear power plant, 70 
per cent rise in GHG emissions related to 
power, 250 per cent rise in energy prices 
(with more expected) 
Poland heavy emphasis on competitiveness concerned about potential leakage 
Portugal Support  
Romania strong objection to 2005 base (instead of 1990 
or original base year), not compensated for 
1989-2005 reductions 
must include 3rd countries (leakage) 
Slovakia 1990 base year high relative costs for NMS, concern about 
potential leakage due to domestic GDP im-
portance of energy intensive sectors 
Spain Support subsidiarity should be observed, especially 
concerning national level RES support 
mechanisms 
Sweden Support  
Source: See the individual country position papers responding to the Climate-Energy Legislative Package and 
posted on the web registry of the European Council: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/. 
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Table 6 
Share of Non-ETS Sectors in Total CO2 Emissions,  
Non-ETS 2020 Targets and Services as a Share of GDP 
(%) 
 
 
Size of Services Sector 
(Share of GDP in 2005) 
Non-ETS Share of  
Total CO2 Output (2005) 
Non-ETS 2020 Target 
Denmark 74.0 58.6 -20 
Ireland 60.0 67.9 -20 
Luxembourg 82.7 79.6 -20 
Sweden 70.5 71.1 -17 
Austria 67.8 64.2 -16 
Finland 66.7 52.2 -16 
Netherlands 74.0 62.1 -16 
United Kingdom 73.7 63.1 -16 
Belgium 74.2 61.5 -15 
France 76.3 76.3 -14 
Germany 69.8 52.6 -14 
Italy 70.2 61.1 -13 
Spain 67.3 58.3 -10 
Cyprus na. 49.0 -5 
Greece 73.1 48.8 -4 
Portugal 71.7 57.4 1 
Slovenia 62.4 57.0 4 
Malta na 41.0 5 
Czech Republic 59.3 43.4 9 
Hungary 65.1 67.5 10 
Estonia 66.9 39.7 11 
Slovakia 66.7 47.3 13 
Poland 64.0 49.3 14 
Lithuania 61.5 70.7 15 
Latvia 73.3 73.4 17 
Romania 50.7 53.9 19 
Bulgaria 58.0 42.0 20 
Source: Service sector data from the World Development Indicators online database, remaining data based 
on data presented in the Impact Assessment. I thank Varsányi Kornél for providing foundational data. 
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Table 7 
Country Positions: EU ETS 
 
 
Division between ETS Sectors 
and Not EU or State-level Cap Additional Comment 
Belgium    
Britain 
economy-wide targets (not 
based only on ETS sectors) EU-wide  
Cyprus    
Estonia 
no strict division, emission 
reductions easier in non-ETS 
sectors 
 
exclusion of SME's under 10 
ktons (if adopt measures to 
reduce emissions) 
Finland    
France    
Germany    
Greece    
Hungary 
favours more flexibility at the 
national level to allocate car-
bon quotas across ETS and 
non-ETS sectors 
  
Italy  
must determine now (not in 
2011) what special arrange-
ments will be granted to en-
ergy intensive industries to 
prevent leakage 
address energy efficiency here, 
see risk of leakage even with 
international agreement 
Lithuania    
Poland 
favours no strict division, 
more flexibility (potential in 
non ETS sectors) 
  
Portugal    
Romania   
adopt EU-wide sectoral stan-
dards for energy intensive in-
dustries 
Slovakia    
Spain    
Sweden    
Source: Same as above (Table 5). 
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Figures 1 & 2 
Total Mitigation Across the EU15 and the EU27 
 
EU15 
 
 
 
EU27 
 
Source: Graphs taken from the European Environment Agency UNFCC reports (EEA, 2007: 10–11). 
–––– Target path 2010
—o— Greenhause gas emissions
o GHG target 2010
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Figure 3 
Change in Total 2020 Target Burden with 2005 Base Year 
(Gain/Loss divided by 1990 GHG Output, Option 4) 
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Source: Own calculations based on UNFCC reported GHG emissions data (UNFCC registry), 2012 Kyoto Tar-
gets for EU Member States (EEA, 2007) and the 2020 targets reported in the Impact Assessment. I thank 
Varsányi Kornél for providing foundational data. 
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Figure 4 
Change in Target Due to Base Year Compared to Change in Emissions 
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Source: Change in emissioncs data from Table 2 and change in target data from Figure 3. 
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Figure 5 
Required Effective GHG Reductions by 2020 from 2005 
Assumes IPCC 50% Reduction Target from 1990 Levels & 2005 Population 
Assumes Equal Per-capita Sharing of World Environment Across Countries 
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Source: Own calculations. Total world GHG emissions data is from the World Resources Institute (WRI) 
online data. Total world GHG emissions are estimated by summing all country level WRI data for 1990 
and then estimating total world GHG emissions by adding the missing share to this total. Target per cap-
ita emissions are derived by dividing 1990 world emissions by the 2005 world population data and then 
multiplying this number by 0.5 (the IPCC 50 per cent reduction target). 2005 GHG emissions (due to the 
lack of adequate 2005 data) are estimated based on the amount of change in CO2 data between 1990 
and 2005. The numbers appearing in the graph above represent the GHG emissions reductions necessary 
to achieve the required level of per capita emissions by 2020 based on 2005 GHG emissions and the ad-
ditional assumption that countries would continue to achieve regular annual emission reductions up to 
2050. 
 
